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Abstract—International verification of nuclear warheads is a
practical problem in which the protection of secret warhead
information is of paramount importance. We propose a measure
that would enable a weapon owner to evaluate the privacy of
a proposed protocol in a technology-neutral fashion. We show
the problem is reducible to ‘natural’ and ‘corrective’ learning.
The natural learning can be computed without assumptions
about the inspector, while the corrective learning accounts for
the inspector’s prior knowledge. The natural learning provides
the warhead owner a useful lower bound on the information
leaked by the proposed protocol. Using numerical examples, we
demonstrate that the proposed measure correlates better with
the accuracy of a maximum a posteriori probability estimate than
alternative measures.
I. INTRODUCTION
The core technical challenge facing future nuclear warhead
disarmament treaties is how to verify that warheads are
being irreversibly dismantled without revealing confidential
warhead-design information to an inspector. Nation states
worry that revealing their nuclear-weapon design secrets may
compromise their nuclear deterrents, for example, by allowing
adversaries to fine-tune countermeasures. However, without
rigorous disarmament verification the disarming state may
cheat by dismantling “hoax objects” while retaining their
authentic warheads in a secret reserve [1–4].
Concern about information leakage has prevented the prac-
tical use of warhead authentication for more than fifty years.
Protocols with significantly enhanced privacy have been more
recently proposed [5–8], but there are no technology-neutral
measures for comparing their relative merits. Protocols need
to be evaluated on their ability to correctly accept authentic
warheads (completeness), reject hoax objects (soundness), and
not reveal secret information (privacy). In this paper we
propose a measure of privacy based on how much an inspector
learns when executing the protocol. Given a set of assumptions
about which warhead design details are important to protect,
and the prior knowledge of the inspector; our measure can be
used to compare competing authentication concepts.
II. PRIVACY MEASURE FOR WARHEAD VERIFICATION
We define nuclear warheads by a set of properties, denoted
Θ. These could include isotope distributions, detonation yields,
or other properties. Due to manufacturing variation, each
warhead can be slightly different so Θ is a random variable
with alphabet ϑ and specific instances θ ∈ ϑ, distributed
according to ptrue(Θ). This true distribution is only known
to the warhead owner. The inspector starts with a prior belief
distribution, p0(Θ), which is their best estimate of ptrue(Θ).
The inspector updates their beliefs using the measured data,
X , according to Bayes’ theorem, shown in Equation 1. The
numbered subscripts on p denote the number of completed
measurements.
p1(Θ = θ) = p0 (Θ = θ|X1 = x) = p0(x|θ)p0(θ)
p0(x)
(1)
The data, X , is also a random variable, with alphabet X and
possible results x ∈ X , distributed according to ptrue(X). It is
dependent on the properties of the specific warhead being mea-
sured as well as the stochastic variation of the measurement.
The stochastic variation is described by the likelihood function
p0(x|θ), which only depends on the physics and procedure of
the measurement process. We will assume that both the owner
and inspector understand the protocol perfectly, so p0(x|θ) is
known exactly and for that reason:
p0(x|θ) = p1(x|θ) = p2(x|θ) = ... = ptrue(x|θ) (2)
To assess privacy, we need a means of quantifying how
much a measurement improves the accuracy of the inspector’s
beliefs about Θ. There are multiple means of measuring the
change between p0(Θ) and p1(Θ), but different measures
highlight different features of any change.
The most common approach is to estimate learning by
the reduction in the entropy of the inspector’s beliefs after
conditioning on the measured data, as originally developed by
Shannon, Lindley, and others[9–11], with the average reduc-
tion being described by the mutual information between the
property of interest and observable data. However, the entropy-
based approach suffers from three shortcomings which reduce
its usefulness in this application. Mutual information estimates
the average amount the inspector learns about Θ assuming
their prior belief distribution was ptrue(Θ). This will not
(indeed, must not) be generally true in warhead authentication,
otherwise there is no private information, which is an essential
feature of the problem. Furthermore, a reduction in Shannon
or differential entropy reflects reduction in uncertainty about
a random variable, rather than necessarily a reduction in
inaccuracy. If the inspector becomes convinced of an incorrect
value for Θ, the entropy of their belief distribution will still
decrease, but the owner would not consider convergence to a
wrong answer to be demonstrative of weak privacy. Finally, the
fact that Shannon entropy (though not the mutual information)
can be negative or undefined for non-discrete random variables
makes comparisons more difficult.
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2A. Quantifying changes in knowledge by changes in KL di-
vergences
We propose to evaluate the inspector’s learning by calcu-
lating how much conditioning on the measured data reduces
the Kullback-Leibler divergence between ptrue(Θ) and the
inspectors belief distribution. We quantify the (in)accuracy of
the inspector beliefs about Θ as the KL divergence between
their belief distribution for Θ and the true distribution for Θ.
Their initial inaccuracy is given by Equation 3. The smaller
this KL divergence is, the more accurate the inspector’s initial
belief distribution. This initial value is independent of the
authentication protocol being analyzed. As long as the same
properties are being considered, this is a consistent starting
point for comparing protocols.
DKL(ptrue(Θ)||p0(Θ)) =
∑
θ∈ϑ
ptrue(θ) log2
(
ptrue(θ)
p0(θ)
)
(3)
After a measurement X , the inaccuracy in the inspector’s
belief is:
DKL(ptrue(Θ)||p1(Θ)) = DKL(ptrue(Θ)||p0(Θ|x)) (4)
=
∑
θ∈ϑ
ptrue(θ) log2
(
ptrue(θ)
p0(θ|x)
)
(5)
The change in the accuracy of the inspector’s beliefs in Θ is
the difference between Equations 3 and 5. If x was a useful
measurement, the belief inaccuracy will be reduced, thus we
subtract the posterior error from the prior error to calculate
the learning, as shown in Equations 7 to 9.
Learning , K(p0(Θ), ptrue(Θ), x) (6)
= DKL(ptrue(Θ)||p0(Θ))−DKL(ptrue(Θ)||p1(Θ)) (7)
=
∑
θ∈ϑ
ptrue(θ) log2
(
p1(θ)
p0(θ)
)
(8)
=
∑
θ∈ϑ
ptrue(θ) log2
(
p0(θ|x)
p0(θ)
)
(9)
The learning measure in 9 incorporates the inspector’s initial
knowledge p0(Θ), the data available to them x, and the
description of the true warhead properties ptrue(Θ). The in-
spector’s method of inference is implied in the posterior belief
distribution p0(Θ|x). The owner does not have access to all of
these components; in most cases the owner will have to guess
the inspector’s prior information and inference method. We
will see the impact of these approximations in the following
subsections. Note that if p0(Θ) = ptrue(Θ), then Equation 9
will reduce to the mutual information when averaged over
x ∈ X . This suggests a strong link between our method and
the traditional entropy-based approach, but ours accounts for
the inspector’s faulty prior.
While the learning measure in Equation 9 shares some
similarities with Jensen-Shannon divergence and comparative
divergence, the authors could not find it in the literature. This
is probably because ptrue(θ) is not known a priori in most
inference or learning situations.
III. EXPECTATION VALUE OF LEARNING
To expand on the features of our proposed measure, in this
section we calculate how much the owner should expect the
inspector to learn about a class of warheads, based on one or
more measurements.
A. Measurement of one warhead
To begin with, we assume the inspector takes one measure-
ment of a single warhead. As above, the class of warheads has
properties Θ, distributed according to ptrue(Θ). The specific
warhead which the inspector measures has Θ = θ∗:
pmeasured warhead(Θ) = ptrue(Θ|θ∗) =
{
1, if Θ = θ∗
0, otherwise
(10)
Therefore, after measuring x, the inspector will have learned:
K(p0(Θ), ptrue(Θ|θ∗), x|θ∗) =
∑
θ∈ϑ
ptrue(θ) log2
(
p0(θ|x)
p0(θ)
)
(11)
= 1× log2
(
p0(θ∗|x)
p0(θ∗)
)
(12)
We can find the expected result by averaging over all the
possible measurement results:
K(p0(Θ), ptrue(Θ|θ∗), X|θ∗) = E
x∈X
{K(p0(Θ), ptrue(Θ|θ∗), x|θ∗)}
(13)
=
∑
x∈X
ptrue(x|θ∗) log2
(
p0(θ∗|x)
p0(θ∗)
)
(14)
Using Bayes’ law (Equation 1), we can trade the argument of
the logarithm:
p0(θ∗|x)
p0(θ∗)
=
p0(x|θ∗)
p0(x)
(15)
Remembering also that the likelihood function for x|θ∗ is the
same for p0 and ptrue (Equation 2), we can also exchange
ptrue(x|θ∗) for p0(x|θ∗), or vice versa.
K(p0(Θ), ptrue(Θ|θ∗), X|θ∗) =
∑
x∈X
p0(x|θ∗) log2
(
p0(x|θ∗)
p0(x)
)
(16)
= DKL (p0(x|θ∗)||p0(x)) (17)
= DKL (ptrue(x|θ∗)||p0(x)) (18)
The expected learning is a KL divergence, so it is non-
negative. This tells us that, on average, the inspector’s belief
will be improved or stay the same after measuring the warhead.
Individual samples of x may be misleading and produce a
negative learning measure, but the owner should expect that,
on average, the inspector will learn something about Θ if it is
related to x.
3B. Measurements over of a class of warheads
We can average the result in Equation 18 over the class
of warheads to see how much the owner should expect the
inspector to learn when measuring several different warheads.
K(p0(Θ),ptrue(Θ), X) = E
θ∗∈Θ
{K(p0(Θ), ptrue(Θ|θ∗), X|θ∗)} (19)
=
∑
θ∗∈Θ
ptrue(θ
∗)
∑
x∈X
ptrue(x|θ∗) log2
(
ptrue(x|θ∗)
p0(x)
)
(20)
=
∑
θ∗∈Θ
∑
x∈X
ptrue(x, θ
∗) log2
(
ptrue(x|θ∗)
p0(x)
)
(21)
Using the definition of conditional and joint probabilities, we
can rearrange the arguments of the logarithm again. At this
stage, because we are averaging over Θ, we can revert to using
θ rather than θ∗ to describe the warhead properties.
K(p0(Θ), ptrue(Θ), X) =
∑
θ∈ϑ
∑
x∈X
ptrue(x, θ) log2
(
ptrue(x, θ)
p0(x)ptrue(θ)
)
(22)
Note that Equation 22 is very similar to the expression for
mutual information. Because the mutual information is purely
a function of the warhead properties and measurement process,
the owner can calculate it without having to make assumptions
about the inspector. It would therefore be useful to describe
the inspector’s learning with respect to it.
K(p0(Θ), ptrue(Θ), X)
=
∑
θ∈ϑ
∑
x∈X
ptrue(x, θ) log2
(
ptrue(x, θ)
p0(x)ptrue(θ)
ptrue(x)
ptrue(x)
)
(23)
=
∑
θ∈ϑ
∑
x∈X
ptrue(x, θ)
(
log2
(
ptrue(x, θ)
ptrue(x)ptrue(θ)
)
+ log2
(
ptrue(x)
p0(x)
)) (24)
=
∑
θ∈ϑ
∑
x∈X
ptrue(x, θ) log2
(
ptrue(x, θ)
ptrue(x)ptrue(θ)
)
+
∑
x∈X
ptrue(x) log2
(
ptrue(x)
p0(x)
) (25)
= I(ptrue(Θ); ptrue(X)) +
∑
x∈X
ptrue(x) log2
(
ptrue(x)
p0(x)
)
(26)
= I(ptrue(Θ); ptrue(X))︸ ︷︷ ︸
natural learning
+DKL(ptrue(X)||p0(X))︸ ︷︷ ︸
corrective learning
(27)
Equation 27 is the most important result. It can be used as
the privacy measure for a parameter Θ. There are two terms,
a ‘natural learning’ component, which depends on the true
correlation between Θ and X; and a ‘corrective learning’
component, which depends on how accurate the inspector’s
prior belief distribution is. The natural learning is described
by the mutual information between Θ and X under their true
distributions. The owner can calculate it accurately without
making assumptions about the inspector, other than Equa-
tion 2. The corrective learning is the KL divergence between
the true distribution of the output data, and the inspector’s prior
estimate of the same. It is highly dependent on the owner’s
estimate of the inspector’s prior.
The inspector’s total learning will be greater than the natural
learning because the corrective learning is a KL divergence
and hence non-negative. Starting from a more inaccurate
prior accelerates the rate of learning, because there is a
greater difference between the measured data and what the
inspector expected. The natural learning component is a useful
lower bound on the average amount learned by the inspector,
but no general upper bound exists. KL divergences are not
upper-bounded in general, and can be infinite in some cases.
However, maximizing the corrective learning will not leave
the inspector with the most knowledge possible, i.e. minimize
Equation 5, in general. This is expanded on in section III-C.
If the the inspector’s prior is equal to the true distribution,
the corrective learning will be zero and the total learning equal
to the natural learning. This returns us to the typical entropy-
based approach, again showing the relationship between it and
our proposed measure. Inferring hyper parameters is discussed
in more detail in section V.
C. Effect of maximizing corrective learning
Choosing a very inaccurate prior belief distribution for
the inspector will increase their average corrective learning.
Here we show that choosing a prior to maximize the average
corrective learning, DKL(ptrue(X)||p0(X)), is not guaranteed
to maximize the accuracy of the inspector’s final belief distri-
bution, DKL(ptrue(Θ)||p0(Θ|X)).
DKL(ptrue(Θ)||p0(Θ|X)) = E
x∈X
{DKL(ptrue(Θ)||p0(Θ|x))} (28)
=
∑
x∈X
ptrue(x|θ)
∑
θ∈ϑ
ptrue(θ)log2
(
ptrue(θ)
p0(θ|x)
)
(29)
=
∑
θ∈ϑ
∑
x∈X
ptrue(x, θ)log2
(
ptrue(θ)
p0(θ|x)
)
(30)
Using Bayes law, we rewrite this equation in terms of the
corrective learning. Reassuringly, we are able to rederive the
learning measure from this alternate starting point.
E
x∈X
{DKL(ptrue(Θ)||p0(Θ|x))}
=
∑
x∈X ,θ∈ϑ
ptrue(x, θ)log2
(
ptrue(θ)
p0(θ|x)
)
(31)
=
∑
x∈X ,θ∈ϑ
ptrue(x, θ)log2
(
ptrue(θ)
p0(x)
p0(x|θ)p0(θ)
)
(32)
=
∑
x∈X ,θ∈ϑ
ptrue(x, θ)log2
(
ptrue(θ)p0(x)
p0(x|θ)p0(θ)
ptrue(x)
ptrue(x)
ptrue(θ)
ptrue(θ)
)
(33)
=
∑
x∈X ,θ∈ϑ
ptrue(x, θ)
(
log2
(
ptrue(θ)
p0(θ)
)
+log2
(
ptrue(θ)ptrue(x)
ptrue(x|θ)ptrue(θ)
)
+ log2
(
p0(x)
ptrue(x)
)) (34)
= DKL(ptrue(Θ)||p0(Θ))− I(ptrue(Θ); ptrue(X))
−DKL(ptrue(X)||p0(X))
(35)
= DKL(ptrue(Θ)||p0(Θ))−K(p0(Θ), ptrue(Θ), X) (36)
Looking at Equation 35, we see that the accuracy of the
inspector’s final belief distribution depends on three factors:
4the accuracy of their prior belief in Θ, the mutual information
between Θ and the data, and the corrective learning. If we
choose p0(Θ) to maximize the corrective learning, we would
expect the accuracy of the prior in Θ to decrease as well,
and the first term of Equation 35 to increase, because the two
are related by the likelihood function p(x|θ). It is simple to
demonstrate by example that the first term can grow faster
than the corrective learning term, showing that maximizing
the corrective learning is not guaranteed to minimize the error
in the inspector’s final belief distribution.
D. Multiple measurements of a warhead
If the inspector is allowed to make multiple measurements
of each test object then they will learn more about the warhead
properties. The second result, X2, is conditionally dependent
on the first if X1 provides any information about Θ. The
learning measure for the second measurement is given by
Equation 38.
K(p0(Θ|X1), ptrue(Θ|X1), X2|X1)
= I(ptrue(Θ|X1); ptrue(X2|X1)) +DKL(ptrue(X2|X1)||p0(X2|X1))
(37)
=
∑
ϑ,X1,X2
ptrue(x1, x2, θ) log2
(
ptrue(x2|x1, θ)
p0(x2|x1)
)
(38)
The average total learning over both measurements is the sum
of Equations 27 and 38. Unless the measurement results are
entirely independent Equation 38 will be less than Equation
27, and the inspector will face diminishing marginal returns
with each successive measurement.
E. Combining learning measures into utility functions
Nuclear warheads are complicated objects and are best
described by multiple properties. The owner can treat all of
these together as one variable Θ and calculate a single value
for the learning measure, in which case the privacy of the pro-
tocol is given by the learning measure: K(p0(Θ), ptrue(Θ), X).
However, some properties may be more important for the
owner to protect than others, in which case the warhead can
be described by a set of properties TN = {Θ1,Θ2, ...,ΘN}.
The owner calculates the privacy measure for each property,
and combines them in a privacy utility function.
The owner can use any privacy utility function they wish,
as long as they use the same one for all protocols. The
utility function will embody a combination of political and
technical concerns about which properties of a warhead are
most important to protect, including emergent properties such
as explosive yield. The owner is unlikely to share their utility
function with the inspector, as it reflects sensitive information.
In the simplest case, the privacy utility function could be a
weighted sum of the individual privacy measures using fixed
weights WN = {w1, w2, ..., wN}, as given in Equation 39. A
more sophisticated function would use weights which depend
on the privacy measure values.
K(TN ,WN , X) =
∑
i=1:N
wiK(p0(Θi), ptrue(Θi), X) (39)
Fig. 1. Comparison of the measure proposed in this paper [A] and Shannon
entropy [B] versus the number of measurements made. The simulation was
run for 10,000 cases, with M = 40, S = 7. The learning measures for
each individual case are shown in grey, the mean result by the solid curve,
and the median result by the dashed curve. The median and mean result are
almost identical in [B]. The KL divergence and Shannon entropy of the prior
distribution are given by the dot-dashed lines.
F. Numerical example
In this section we provide a simple numerical example to
demonstrate that our approach is a more accurate measure of
inspector knowledge than Shannon entropy. The expression for
the change in Shannon entropy is given in Equation 40.
E{H(p0(Θ))−H(p0(Θ|x))} =
∑
x∈X
∑
θ∈ϑ
ptrue(x)p0(θ|x) log2
(
p0(θ|x)
p0(θ)
)
(40)
For this example, we define warheads using one property,
Θ, distributed according to a normal distribution with mean M
and variance S2. The inspector can take measurements of the
test objects, producing data X , which we assume is distributed
according to a Poisson distribution reflecting the statistics of
frequently used radiation-based tools. Starting from a prior
belief distribution p0(Θ), the inspector uses a maximum a
posteriori probability (MAP) estimator for Θ, which we denote
Θ˜. p0(Θ) is a discrete uniform distribution between two limits.
ptrue(Θ = θ) = N [θ, µ = M,σ = S2] (41)
ptrue(X = x|θ) = Poisson[x, λ = θ] (42)
Figures 1, 2, and 3 compare the privacy / learning assessments
using the method we propose, and the Shannon entropy
approach. 10,000 warheads were simulated, with the inspector
attempting to infer Θ for each based on up to 100 mea-
surements. The grey lines in Figures 1.A and 1.B show the
progression of the two learning measures for each individual
case with each measurement. The Shannon entropy measure
increases with almost every measurement, while our proposed
measure increases and decreases as more data is collected
but drifts upwards on average. The prior distribution was
uniformly distributed so any new data, accurate or otherwise,
produces a more peaked posterior distribution and reduces
the entropy. Our measure is able to better capture when data
produces a less accurate estimate of Θ.
While the average change in both measures correspond
almost identically with the average change in the error of Θ˜,
they have very different case-by-case correlation, as shown in
Figure 2. Our proposed measure shows an almost one-to-one
relationship with Θ˜ for each posterior, as shown in Figures
2.A and 2.D, and there is a linear correlation of 0.88 across
posteriors. While the entropy measure also increases with each
5Fig. 2. Changes in the values of the two learning measures versus the MAP
estimator error for Θ. [A] and [B] show the result for each of the 10,000
cases, after 1, 10, and 100 measurements in blue, green, red respectively. [C]
depicts the mean absolute MAP error versus both learning measures. [D] gives
the linear correlation between the absolute MAP error and the two measures
after each measurement.
Fig. 3. Changes in the values of the two learning measures versus the
uncertainty of the inspector’s belief in Θ. The uncertainty was estimated by the
smallest span around Θ˜ in ϑ which included 30% of the integral of the belief
distribution. [A] and [B] show the result for each of the 10,000 cases, after
1, 10, and 100 measurements in blue, green, red respectively. [C] depicts the
mean MAP uncertainty versus both learning measures. [D] gives the linear
correlation between the belief uncertainty and the two measures after each
measurement.
measurement, there is only a linear correlation of 0.45 across
the posteriors.
A similar relationship exists between the two measures
and the inspector’s belief uncertainty, but the correlation is
reversed, as shown in Figure 3. We estimate belief uncertainty
as the smallest span around Θ˜ in ϑ which included 30% of
the integral of the belief distribution. More work is required
to understand these relationships in detail and how the operate
for any arbitrary distribution.
IV. INSPECTOR WITH INCORRECT LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION
So far we have assumed that the warhead owner and
inspector both understand the protocol and measurement pro-
cesses perfectly. This was reflected in them both knowing the
likelihood function of the data given the warhead properties
(Equation 2). We made extensive use of this identity when
deriving our privacy measure.
If we relax this assumption by removing Equation 2, we can
examine situations in which the inspector attempts to infer Θ
with an incorrect or incomplete likelihood function. This could
reflect a range of warhead-protection strategies, for example,
where the measured data is scrambled using a secret key,
so that the inspector only has access to the naive, key-less
likelihood function.
K(p0(Θ), ptrue(Θ), X) =
∑
x∈X
ptrue(x|θ)
∑
θ∈ϑ
ptrue(θ) log2
(
p0(θ|x)
p0(θ)
)
(43)
=
∑
x∈X
∑
θ∈ϑ
ptrue(x, θ) log2
(
p0(θ|x)
p0(θ)
)
(44)
Using the result in Equation 21, we can see the difference
between this measure and our original result.
K(p0(Θ), ptrue(Θ), x)
=
∑
x∈X
∑
θ∈ϑ
(
ptrue(x, θ) log2
(
p0(θ|x)
p0(θ)
)
− ptrue(x, θ) log2
(
ptrue(x|θ)
p0(x)
))
+ I(ptrue(Θ); ptrue(X)) +DKL(ptrue(X)||p0(X))
(45)
=
∑
x∈X
∑
θ∈ϑ
(
ptrue(x, θ) log2
(
p0(x|θ)p0(x)
ptrue(x|θ)p0(x)
))
+ I(ptrue(Θ); ptrue(X)) +DKL(ptrue(X)||p0(X))
(46)
= I(ptrue(Θ); ptrue(X)) +DKL(ptrue(X)||p0(X))
− E
θ∈ϑ
{DKL(ptrue(X|θ)||p0(X|θ))} (47)
An incorrect understanding of the likelihood function can
decrease the accuracy of the inspector’s beliefs. While the third
term is a sum over both X and Θ, it still has the properties
of a KL divergence.
To demonstrate this more general case, we return to the
example in III-F, but the output X is modified using a random
variable Y , with alphabet y ∈ Y . A value for Y is assigned to
each measurement of the warheads, as described in Equations
48 to 50. The inspector knows the distribution of Y but not
its value, so attempts to infer Θ using the likelihood function
in Equation 51
ptrue(Θ = θ) = N [θ, µ = M,σ = S2] (48)
ptrue(Y = y) = N [θ, µ = 20, σ = 15] (49)
ptrue(X = x|θ, y) = Poisson[x, λ = θ + y] (50)
ptrue(X = x|θ) =
∑
y∈Y
ptrue(y)Poisson[x, λ = θ + y] (51)
This example demonstrates the differences between our pro-
posed measure and the entropy-based approach most clearly.
Figure 4 compares the two measures with the error in the
inspector’s MAP estimate of Θ over 100 measurements of
10,000 warheads. The addition of the secret key causes the
inspector’s estimate to converge to an incorrect result, on
average 9.5 away from the mean. While, the entropy-based
measure shows almost the same progression as before, grad-
ually increasing as the inspectors posterior becomes more
peaked, our proposed measure decreases in almost all cases,
as the inspector’s posterior distribution becomes less similar
to the correct answer. Because we are most interested in the
6Fig. 4. Comparison of our proposed measure and the entropy-based approach
when the inspector attempts to infer Θ using the incorrect likelihood function
in Equation 51. [A] and [B] show the progression of the two measures versus
the number of measurements taken over 10,000 simulated cases. The learning
measures for each individual case are shown in grey, the mean result by the
solid curve, and the median result by the dashed curve. [C] and [D] compare
the error in the inspector’s MAP estimate of Θ with the value of the learning
measures in each case. [E] and [F] show the mean result of the same.
accuracy, rather than uncertainty, of the inspector’s knowledge
of the warhead, it is far more useful for a measure of inspector
learning / protocol privacy to be sensitive to this change.
V. INFERRING HYPERPARAMETERS
The examples so far have considered the case where an
inspector was interested in learning the value of the parameter
Θ for a set of warheads. The inspector may also be interested
in the distribution of Θ itself, governed by the hyperparameters
M and S. We can assess the privacy of these hyperparameters
using the same measure as before.
K(p0(M,S), ptrue(M,S), X)
= I(ptrue(M,S); ptrue(X)) +DKL(ptrue(X)||p0(X))
(52)
In the example above, M and S take only one value, as shown
in the equation below.
ptrue(M,S) =
{
1, if (M,S) = (M∗, S∗)
0, otherwise
(53)
This makes the mutual info / natural learning zero, as there is
no uncertainty in M and S if you know ptrue(M,S), which is
an assumption underlying the mutual information calculation.
K(p0(M,S), ptrue(M,S), X) = 0 +DKL(ptrue(X|M∗, S∗)||p0(X))
(54)
VI. SUMMARY
In this paper, we have proposed a new measure for evaluat-
ing the privacy of warhead authentication protocols. It allows
for equitable comparison of any protocol, which is an im-
provement over the bespoke measures previously proposed for
individual protocols. We have demonstrated that our measure
correlates better with the accuracy of a MAP estimate of
warhead properties than alternative measures. It can be used
to predict the average performance of a protocol beforehand,
or a post-fact analysis of the knowledge gained given specific
measured data. The measure accommodates different assump-
tions about which warhead properties need to be considered,
and the definition of a measurement can be expanded to
include multiple separate measurements, or measurements of
multiple objects. This makes the measure flexible and able to
be used to compare protocols under a variety of authentication
requirements; as long as the same assumptions are used for all
of the protocols. These assumptions are a political-technical
judgment which must be made before serious comparison of
protocols can happen.
While we have focused on privacy and information leakage
in a warhead disarmament context, our measure could be used
to assess other protocols which deal with private information.
It can be applied to situations where a party releases data,
knowing the true distribution of the private information, and
wishes to predict how much an adversary will improve given
inaccurate prior beliefs. For example, if an analysis of a
person’s medical records were to be released as part of a
trial, the measure could be used to calculate how much an
adversary would learn about that person’s medical history. The
adversary’s initial belief distribution is based on the properties
of the general population (an erroneous p0(Θ)), while the data
is only drawn from the patient (ptrue(Θ)). Our measure allows
an individual to assess their privacy before consenting to the
analysis.
In the introduction to the paper, we discussed the three re-
quirements of authentication protocols: completeness, sound-
ness, and privacy. There is a tension between protocol sound-
ness and privacy, because the former prefers more transparent
information to be released to help identify hoaxes, while
the latter requires less transparency. Our ongoing work is to
develop an equivalent measure for protocol soundness, and
understand how it trades-off with privacy.
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